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aDonna Pavetti and her coauthors have described an
 interesting study in several carefully and logically chosen 
sites. The goal of the study is “exploratory” and descriptive—to 
see what role “intermediaries” are playing as the story of 
welfare reform unfolds. Such studies can be thought of as a 
special type of process-implementation study, a research genre 
that has enjoyed a renaissance in the welfare reform era. 
Process-implementation studies are valuable for specifying 
what the “treatment” is and thus help to unpack the “black-
box” process between policy and product.
We seek to place this study in a broader context. As it stands, 
the study focuses on what is occurring with the welfare 
department as well as on the type of services that have been 
devolved to intermediary organizations. Howard Becker’s 
classic essay “Whose Side Are We On?” (1967) admonished 
scholars to look at a given problem from all points of view. The 
paper takes the point of view of the local welfare department, 
but the intermediaries themselves and the clients that must rely 
on such intermediaries for services also deserve some interest. 
Thus, the story is only one-third told.
Enlarging our scope to encompass the agency and client 
points of view takes us somewhat out of the welfare reform 
context and into the larger world of low-income families and 
the various public and private institutions that attempt to serve 
them. To illustrate why such points of view might be of interest 
to those who make or study policy for the poor, we draw on 
three sources: an ethnographic study of two large multiservice 
nonprofits (NPs) conducted in the early 1990s (Edin and Lein 
1998); a longitudinal study (with two rounds of interviews 
conducted between 1998 and 2000 under the auspices of 
Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation) of thirty 
nonprofits in a single, large metropolitan area that serve welfare 
clients;1 and a small exploratory study of the prospective clients 
of these same nonprofits (Kissane 2001). We deem these 
studies of nonprofits and their actual and prospective clients 
relevant because most intermediary agencies identified by 
Pavetti and her colleagues were nonprofits.
Some of the NPs we refer to in these studies were the types 
of intermediary agencies that Pavetti et al. studied: they had a 
contract with the welfare department or another entity that 
controlled welfare dollars, such as welfare-to-work. Other NPs 
received welfare dollars more indirectly through reimbursement 
for services rendered (such as child-care or support services). 
Finally, some of our NPs received no welfare or other 
government monies, but some had considered doing so. 
What’s Happening with the Agencies
Welfare reformers hoped that nonprofit social services agencies 
would work together to weave a private safety net to partly 
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replace the public safety net they were dismantling. Although 
this expectation caused considerable scholarly debate (for 
example, see De Vita [1999]; Diaz et al. [1996]; Smith [1999]), 
it caused surprisingly little public debate. To the extent that 
policymakers and the general public are relying on these 
agencies to provide a sort of private safety net as the public 
safety net shrinks, the health and financial well-being of such 
agencies should be of concern. 
The various NPs that we and our colleagues have studied 
have expressed many concerns over the eroding public safety 
net and their actual or prospective role in substituting their 
services for the ones the government used to provide. As part of 
the Urban Change study, data from NPs in four cities show that 
NPs have largely not taken on the mantle imposed on them by 
welfare reform’s architects and have few plans for meeting the 
demands that time limits or other aspects of welfare reform 
might impose (Fink and Widom 2001). Our Philadelphia NPs, 
which also participated in the above study, have reacted 
similarly. Some have taken on government contracts or have 
received welfare dollars for services rendered to welfare clients. 
Yet even if they receive no government money, all of our NPs 
serve welfare clients, and as we have talked to the directors and 
observed the daily operations of some agencies, we have 
identified several ways in which welfare reform might be 
affecting them. 
1. Change of Function. Scholars have long argued that 
nonprofits that take on government contracts might 
profoundly change in ways that might not serve the 
interests of their clients (Lipsky and Smith 1989-90; 
Lipsky and Smith 1995; Smith 1999). Our example of this 
phenomenon is drawn from an NP that received a 
government contract for the first time (see Edin and Lein 
[1998]). Although the contract was not with the welfare 
department, the example below illustrates the pressures 
that government contracts of any kind may place on a 
small grassroots nonprofit. 
At the beginning of Laura Lein’s study of several 
nonprofits in the early 1990s, “All Service” accepted 
federal support to provide meals for eligible neighbor-
hood children.2 In order to comply with the program 
guidelines of the funder, the agency had to guarantee that 
only children under seventeen would receive the meals. 
While the children were fed in a fenced-in, outdoor 
pavilion, other community members occasionally 
gathered outside the facility to watch the meal in progress. 
In this Mexican-American community, children are 
expected to follow social norms of mutual exchange and 
offer food to other people who wished it. Thus, agency 
volunteers soon found themselves intervening to prevent 
children from sharing their food with other people they 
knew. The staff quickly realized that they were spending 
valuable time and energy on a regulatory activity that 
neither helped the children nor expressed their own 
values. In the end, they gave up the contract in order to 
regain control over their program management.
Our second example of how NPs may alter their 
function is more directly relevant to the welfare reform 
context. The example is drawn from the longitudinal 
study of thirty nonprofit social service agencies in 
Philadelphia, all of which serve welfare clients. One 
complaint sometimes voiced by directors is that “all the 
dollars” were going to programs that took a “work-first” 
approach.3 Agencies feared that they would not secure, or 
would risk losing, funding if they did not offer “rapid 
immersion” or incorporate job readiness into their 
current programs. Some of these NPs had long offered 
job-placement programs for welfare clients, but these 
programs generally were focused more on employability 
(that is, education, training, mental health, soft skills, 
supportive services) than on rapid immersion into the 
labor force. Some lost their funding in the mid-1990s,  
prior to our first round of interviews. At least two 
directors suspected that this was the result of a work-first 
bias on the part of their funders. One director of a job-
placement program described the trend in funding as 
follows, “Agencies are in a pickle because the funders are 
all ‘jobs, jobs, jobs’ . . . that’s all they want from the social 
services. But we know that more needs to be done than 
just that. You need to juggle the stuff that we already do 
[like basic education] with the jobs stuff.” Another 
director reflected, “[I tell the staff,] ‘let’s move these 
people.’ But are we really doing a service [just shoving 
them out]? And we don’t want to—and we really can’t 
because we are a small agency and because we are a 
community [agency] and because our staff is 
representative of the community, there is a lot more 
empathy to what the real issues are. I find the staff truly, 
truly struggling with these issues.” Pavetti et al. find some 
of the same forces at work (see also De Vita [1999]; Smith 
[1999]). 
2. The Paper Trail. Some directors in the longitudinal study 
of nonprofits complained about what they viewed as the 
ruination of the organizational culture that occurs when 
NPs begin to rely on government dollars. One director of 
a grassroots agency pointed to several other NPs that 
“used to be smaller, social service/advocacy organizations 
in the neighborhood,” but had become “bureaucratic 
nightmares themselves” and are now “arms of the 
department of public welfare.” The agencies that had 
taken on such contracts talked at length about the added 
accountability and paperwork burdens they now faced. 
More bureaucracy means higher overhead costs, and 
unless a nonprofit has funding that allows for cross-
subsidization of programs or specifically for overhead 
(both of which are increasingly rare), nonprofits are left 
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3. Show Me the Money. Another complaint voiced by agency 
personnel in the longitudinal study of nonprofits—
particularly those that have actually had contracts with 
the welfare department or received welfare-to-work 
dollars—relates to the financial risk involved in serving as 
an intermediary agency. Pavetti et al. report that “the most 
common payment structures” in their study “are cost 
reimbursement, where organizations are paid for the costs 
they incur, or pay-for-performance, where organizations 
are paid based on their accomplishments.” Many of the 
reimbursement contracts also had performance incentive 
structures built in and/or performance criteria that had to 
be recorded for evaluation purposes. 
Both cost-reimbursement and performance-based  
contracts require NPs, which are often on a shoestring 
budget (Urban Institute 1983), to take huge financial 
risks. Agencies with either type of contract faced a similar 
problem: getting clients. Pavetti et al. also find that the 
number of clients referred to intermediaries is often 
unpredictable. Theoretically, clients are supposed to come 
from the welfare department, via caseworker referral. One 
director we interviewed whose agency had a performance-
based contract waited eight months before seeing a single 
client for the program. Because of bad past experiences 
with other such contracts, she had decided not to hire any 
program staff until the clients had actually arrived. 
Though her prudence probably saved the agency from 
financial disaster, she believes that clients may have 
suffered from her wariness because when they did arrive, 
she had no trained staff to meet them. 
Reasons for the lack of caseworker referrals remain 
mysterious, both to the NPs and to us, and we were 
fascinated to see that the Pavetti et al. sample reports 
similar problems. The problem could lie with the 
caseworkers, with the intermediaries, or with potential 
clients, for reasons we speak directly to below. One can 
well imagine that overworked caseworkers might have 
little time to keep track of which agencies are offering 
services when and which clients are eligible. However, 
Pavetti et al. find that even when the welfare department 
did make referrals, the clients would only show up and 
enroll in the program about half the time. Furthermore, 
when nonprofits do manage to get clients, clients do not 
always “perform” to the standards of the contract. One 
director we interviewed pointed out the obvious financial 
difficulty this imposed on the agency—an agency cannot 
base staff pay solely on client performance. 
Even for reimbursement-based programs, like those 
that Pavetti et al.’s respondents most often described, the 
process of securing a contract and establishing a program 
nearly always required large up-front investments that 
NPs feared may not be recouped for a long period of time. 
One director of a very large agency told us that they had 
applied for a performance-based contract funded by 
welfare-to-work. The agency was awarded the contract, 
but after talking with other NPs that had received such 
contracts, it turned down the money. The director said, 
“I was so glad that we turned it down, because it sounded 
like it was a nightmare. . . . I talked to a number of other 
agencies and they all had such nightmare stories, I decided 
this is crazy. [We would have to pay staff] and we wouldn’t 
get the money until people were in jobs for three months, 
six months, a year.” She went on to complain that, “the 
department of welfare was supposed to be feeding us the 
clients and they weren’t feeding the clients to these other 
agencies, so I decided that it just wasn’t worth it for us to 
do it. Even though the department of welfare swore that 
this was changing—that they were really going to feed the 
clients—[I didn’t believe them]. Even afterwards, I was 
talking to people and they were still having a hard time 
getting the clients.” She concluded, “I didn’t feel I could 
jeopardize the organization by taking that contract. [The 
start-up capital comes from us] and then [we’d have to] 
hope that we’d get reimbursed.” 
A director of another large nonprofit said that a 
performance-based contract requires a large volume of 
clients to remain solvent, and if the flow of referrals is low 
or unpredictable and/or other problems occur, there is a 
lot of “anger and bad feeling between the vendor and the 
contracting agent.” 
Even agencies providing support services reported that 
the slow and often Byzantine process of getting 
reimbursed could cause great fiscal strain. One executive 
director of an agency that provides child care (among 
other services) said, “We cannot continue to hemorrhage 
from not receiving the payments” from the welfare 
department for the children in its child-care center. “The 
welfare department always finds a way to screw things up. 
We are still in the black and we can’t go through another 
year like this . . . it could close this agency and ones like it.”
The Client Point of View
Pavetti et al. readily acknowledge that the intermediaries expect 
that only half of the individuals referred to them will actually 
come into their programs. This is especially notable given the 
often severe consequences attached to not attending the 
programs (such as sanctioning). While a client-based study is 
beyond the scope of the current paper, other studies hint at 
what might be going on here. We and our colleagues have been 
involved in two such studies (Edin and Lein 1998; Kissane 
2001), and we refer to them here to speculate about what might 
be going on in the minds and lives of clients who must 
increasingly turn to intermediaries to get the services they 
might have formerly gotten directly from the welfare 
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organizations (one of which is the aforementioned All Service) 
and interview clients as well as agency personnel. In taking into 
account both points of view, they find that policies that were 
rational for the agency were often irrational from the client 
point of view. In both agencies, fiscal constraints, the demands 
of funders, and agency personnel’s need to feel that they were 
“doing a good job” conspired to create a set of policies that 
Edin and Lein dubbed “targeting,” “rationing,” and 
“investing.” 
In their early years, both agencies had provided a diverse 
array of services in their communities. Over time, however, one 
agency (“Community Cooperative”) began to feel increased 
pressure to target one or two programs rather than provide a 
broad range of services.4 This decision provided it with a clear 
mission, which both pleased its funders and satisfied its own 
need to feel good about the work it was doing. The agency also 
increasingly rationed the amount of services any one client 
could receive, allowing it to serve a larger number of 
community members and thereby increasing its perceived 
“effectiveness” in the eyes of funders. 
While such targeting and rationing strategies were rational 
procedures for the agency to adopt, such actions looked 
different from the client point of view. First, targeting meant 
that clients who had needs in multiple domains (for example, 
help paying for both food and prescription drugs) had to utilize 
a number of agencies, each of which targeted a specific domain. 
Second, rationing meant that clients often had to approach 
several agencies to meet their needs even in a single domain 
(such as food). The third practice—investing—consisted of 
targeting discretionary resources to those clients viewed as 
more likely to “succeed” and less likely to return for additional 
services. Investing, while rational from the agency point of view 
(agencies could claim a higher “success rate”), meant that the 
most able clients could command a lion’s share of the agency’s 
discretionary resources, while the least able (and most needy) 
could not access these resources. 
While the targeting, rationing, and investing strategies of 
NPs may dissuade some potential clients from using social 
services, other factors may also play a role in nonparticipation. 
Kissane (2001) finds that although none of the Philadelphia 
agencies limited their services to particular racial or ethnic 
groups, they did tend to serve one ethnic or racial group more 
frequently. Members of other racial or ethnic groups living in a 
certain section of the city associated high stigma in utilizing the 
services of an agency that was not identified with their racial or 
ethnic group or that was identified with other types of 
“undesirables” (such as the homeless). Respondents told 
Kissane that they preferred using services with clientele that 
were “more normal” and “more like” themselves. Often, 
stigma was high enough to keep these women from claiming 
any available services. This was particularly true if the agency 
was located in a neighborhood that was perceived to be 
“unsafe” or the “territory” of another racial or ethnic group. 
Respondents who talked about such agencies said that it would 
be “too dangerous” to make use of the services offered, and that 
they would likely be mugged or molested. 
Ironically, these same respondents did not express similar 
fears about going to the welfare office, also located in a 
“dangerous” area, nor did concerns over the “types” of people 
using welfare dissuade them from getting welfare themselves. 
Kissane’s respondents also reported that they felt more stigma 
when utilizing certain nongovernmental services than those 
provided directly through the welfare department. Such 
reluctance often meant that these potential clients had unmet 
needs. It is possible that similar forces (stigma, racial or ethnic 
identification, location) may affect the willingness of welfare 
recipients to utilize programs offered by intermediaries, and 
they may partly explain the problems in client flow that Pavetti 
et al. have identified. Both the Edin and Lein and the Kissane 
findings suggest that the use of intermediaries might prove 
problematic from the client point of view, even if the policies 
such intermediaries implement are rational and well-meaning.
Conclusion
What lessons do we draw from considering, however 
speculatively, the points of view of the nonprofit agencies 
themselves and of the potential and actual clients of such 
agencies? First, contracting with the welfare department may 
significantly alter the function of nonprofits, influence their 
fiscal well-being, and create huge administrative demands for 
which they may not be compensated. Agencies that experience 
such demands might well get out of the business of welfare 
reform altogether, and other agencies that might have been 
considering such a role may choose not to participate based on 
the experiences of those who have. Alternatively, some agencies 
that manage to make welfare contracts work for themselves 
might find that they have significantly altered their function, 
sometimes to the detriment of clients. Second, clients who are 
sent to such agencies to receive the assistance they formerly 
received at the welfare department might, for reasons outlined 
above, have to utilize several services (thus increasing clients’ 
transaction costs significantly) to meet all of their needs. Third, 
if stigma, racial or ethnic identification, or fears about the 
agency’s location prove to be more salient in the case of 
intermediates than for the welfare office itself, increased use of 
intermediaries might mean that fewer eligible clients will 
receive assistance.Endnotes
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1. The longitudinal nonprofit data used in this paper were collected as 
part of Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation’s Project on 
Devolution and Urban Change. We would like to thank Gordon 
Berlin, Barbara Goldman, our many funders, and our collaborators 
for their support of this work. We also thank Laura Lein for her 
comments.
2. All Service is a pseudonym.
3. Interestingly, the dollars they were referring to were not only 
public, but private as well. Apparently, even private funders have 
caught the work-first fever (perhaps in response to what they feel is an 
unassailable mandate by the public sector). 
4. Community Cooperative is a pseudonym.References
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